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Over the past thirty years, the activities of the Federal Reserve
System have undergone major change. Public interest and conﬁdence in
monetary policy have grown immensely. Low inﬂation has emerged, if
not as the primary objective of monetary policy, at least as a more central
focus than it was thirty years ago. The Federal Reserve System has also
undergone changes. Reserve Banks now charge for many of their
ﬁnancial services, rather than providing them free to banks that are
System members. Placed in competition with commercial banks in
providing ﬁnancial services, Reserve Banks have striven to be more
efﬁcient, more responsive, and more innovative. At the same time,
Reserve Banks have played increasingly active and increasingly visible
roles in their communities and their Districts, providing economic
expertise and civic leadership.
Frank E. Morris, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
from 1968 to 1988, was a key contributor to all these developments. The
year after he took ofﬁce, the Boston Fed sponsored a conference on
“Controlling Monetary Aggregates,” at which the role of the monetary
aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy was vigorously debated.
This was the ﬁrst of a series of conferences on important public policy
issues that continues to this day.
Frank was also a champion of regional research and of the Reserve
Banks using their expertise to contribute to the economic well-being of
their Districts. In the mid 1970s, Frank and the Boston Bank played a
leadership role in helping the Commonwealth of Massachusetts resolve a
critical ﬁnancial crisis, by providing credible analysis of the state’s
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became very active in local employment and training policy and in trying
to improve the schools in the City of Boston.
Under Frank, the Boston Fed was also very inﬂuential in the
development of the payments process. A Bank conference in 1974
broached the possibility of charging for ﬁnancial services. The conference
and subsequent work shaped the thinking of one of the Bank’s directors,
William Miller. When Miller became Chairman of the Board of the
Federal Reserve System, he was a strong supporter of the concept and
instrumental in passage of the Monetary Control Act of 1980, which
required the Fed to price its services.
Frank made many other important contributions to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and the Federal Reserve System. However, his
inﬂuence was felt most strongly in the conduct of monetary policy, in the
evolution of the payments system, and in shaping the role that Reserve
Banks play in their regions. Accordingly, this conference focused on these
three areas and on the developments that have occurred since Frank
became president of the Boston Fed in 1968 and the prospects and
challenges ahead. Three sessions addressed issues in monetary policy,
and one each tackled payments and the role of the regional Banks.
A theme that emerges from this conference is the importance of the
Federal Reserve System communicating clearly and repeatedly its com-
mitment to a low rate of inﬂation. In the early 1970s, the conduct of
monetary policy was shaped by a plethora of objectives and concerns.
Many economists questioned whether monetary policy should place
much weight on inﬂation, as compared to low unemployment, or even
whether monetary policy could affect inﬂation. Today, no one doubts that
monetary policy can affect inﬂation.
The current emphasis on low inﬂation does not mean that other
objectives are ignored. While some central banks have adopted formal
rules limiting inﬂation, the Federal Reserve’s past success in combating
inﬂation and its forceful communication of its commitment to low
inﬂation have given it the best of both worlds. The public seems
persuaded that inﬂation will remain low, while the Fed retains the
ﬂexibility to respond to economic conditions, including a softer economy,
as seems ﬁt.
That a clearly deﬁned, overarching goal may allow some discretion
in implementation is apparent in the Federal Reserve’s response to
international developments. A review of the Fed’s actions over the past
thirty years reveals that international developments have often affected
policy. However, few, if any, doubt that U.S. monetary policy is driven by
U.S. concerns and that foreign developments are taken into consideration
primarily because of their potential to affect the United States.
While the Federal Reserve must communicate its message clearly, the
public must be receptive. In this regard, the regional Reserve Banks play
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ambassadors and goodwill representatives to the residents of the Dis-
tricts. Interactions on issues often far removed from monetary policy help
to ensure that the communication channels are there when it becomes
necessary to justify an unpopular policy.
In this regard, developments pertaining to the payments system are
both supportive and potentially threatening. By making ﬁnancial services
available to all depository institutions at a price rather than providing
them free to System members, the Federal Reserve System serves a
broader array of institutions. Smaller institutions now look to the Fed for
services, whereas once they saw the Fed as working more for large banks.
However, while the process of competing has led the Fed to expand and
diversify its contacts, it has also created pressures to cut costs and
consolidate. If carried sufﬁciently far, these actions could undermine the
stature of individual Reserve Banks.
MONETARY POLICY AND THE MONETARY AGGREGATES
Frank Morris joined the Federal Reserve System at a time of ﬁerce
debate over the role that the monetary aggregates should play in the
conduct of monetary policy. William Poole, who was an active partici-
pant in these debates, reviewed their evolution and the lessons he draws
for today’s policymakers.
While the Federal Open Market Committee was beginning to pay
attention to the monetary aggregates and actually changed its directive in
1970 to include an explicit reference to modest growth in money and bank
credit, considerable skepticism existed in academia and in the Fed itself
about whether the Fed could actually control the aggregates and, if it
could, whether it should. Opponents were concerned not only about the
impact on aggregate demand and unemployment, but also about the
consequences for individual sectors of the economy. However, the failure
to contain inﬂation in the 1970s eventually led to the adoption of a
monetary target in 1979. While some believe that the target was adopted,
not through monetarist sentiments, but as a cover for letting interest rates
rise to unprecedented heights, the outcome was a sharp decline in
inﬂation. While the cost in terms of a recession was high, there was no
doubt that monetary policy could affect inﬂation.
Subsequently, the relationship between the monetary aggregates and
the growth in economic activity broke down and the monetary aggre-
gates were abandoned as a target. Not abandoned were the commitment
to low inﬂation and the recognition that monetary policy can achieve it.
Another lesson that Poole takes from the debates over the monetary
aggregates is the importance of a forward-looking, focused strategy. In
the early 1970s, the FOMC conducted monetary policy meeting by
meeting. No consideration was given to how changes in monetary policy
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tions might, in turn, feed back to affect policy. While the type of formal
rule that Milton Friedman advocated for money growth may not be
necessary, central bankers need to think strategically and to take the
public’s reactions to their actions into account.
Jerry Jordan agreed that the key to successful monetary policy is the
objective. As another active participant in the debates of the 1970s, Jordan
had thought that the primary issue was choosing the appropriate
monetary aggregate. He now sees the debate over rules versus discretion
and the choice of the monetary aggregate as stemming from the absence
of a clear objective that could anchor monetary policy. If the central bank
is ﬁrmly committed to price stability and people believe in this commit-
ment, then they will act in ways that tend to bring this about and the
choice of an intermediate target is secondary.
Charles Freedman recounted the experience of the Bank of Canada.
Canada moved to a monetary target somewhat earlier than the United
States; but there as well, ﬁnancial innovations caused the relationship
between the monetary target and economic activity to break down in the
1980s. Efforts to develop an alternative monetary target failed; and in the
early 1990s, Canada adopted an explicit inﬂation target. This experience
has been quite favorable.
Operationally, the Bank of Canada targets forecast, rather than
current, inﬂation; and this forward-looking focus overcomes many of the
disadvantages thought to be associated with inﬂation targeting. Freed-
man believes that an inﬂation target can be very helpful in achieving low
rates of inﬂation. A number of countries in addition to Canada have
adopted explicit inﬂation targets, and most of these have succeeded in
moving from the ranks of relatively high-inﬂation countries to the
low-inﬂation group.
A focal point of the general discussion was the credibility of the
central bank’s commitment to low inﬂation. An established track record
in achieving low inﬂation and a supportive ﬁscal policy were seen as
enhancing credibility. However, in part because institutional arrange-
ments change, sensitivity to the dangers of inﬂation tends to wax and
wane—even more within the economics profession, perhaps, than among
the public at large. Thus, monetary policymakers should take advantage
of every opportunity to communicate the virtues of a low-inﬂation
environment.
MONETARY POLICY AND CREDIT MARKETS
Benjamin Friedman observed that while interest rates were the
instrument of monetary policy thirty years ago and still are today, the
way policy is conducted is very different. Reinforcing the theme devel-
oped in the ﬁrst session, Friedman noted that the commitment to price
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policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s—choosing the appropriate level of
interest rates—is still with us. Particularly when inﬂation and expecta-
tions of inﬂation are changing, it is difﬁcult to distinguish movements in
nominal and real interest rates. Although U.S. policymakers have coped
satisfactorily with this problem in recent years, many observers are
uncomfortable that there is no nominal target to guide policy. Inﬂation
targeting has a number of adherents, but Friedman is skeptical. In
particular, he believes that one of the supposed virtues of inﬂation
targeting—its transparency—is greatly overstated. Most central banks
that target inﬂation now acknowledge that they also care about output,
but decline to be pinned down as to how much. So while they may be
clear about inﬂation, they are opaque about the real side of the economy.
Friedman is concerned that ﬁnancial innovations, particularly the
growth of electronic transactions, may eventually undermine central
banks’ ability to conduct monetary policy. All standard conceptions of
how monetary policy works depend upon banks having reserves with the
central bank. With the growth of electronic commerce, more and more
ﬁnancial transactions may bypass the banking system, so that changes in
reserves may have less impact on economic activity than in the past.
In his comments, James Duesenberry stressed that tightening mon-
etary policy requires public support. No one likes higher interest rates;
presenting them under the cover of a money or inﬂation target may make
them more palatable. He also observed that our ability to forecast
economic activity and our understanding of the links between interest
rates, output, and inﬂation have not advanced greatly over the past thirty
years. Given these uncertainties, the Fed should act cautiously, moving
interest rates in small increments; and should more turbulent times call
for larger changes, the Fed must be ready to reverse direction if these
moves prove to be too much.
Stephen Axilrod commented on some of the operational issues
associated with an interest rate policy. One virtue of a money supply
target is that it is relatively stable, while interest rates change frequently.
Until recently, the Fed was silent as to its interest rate target, and
occasionally this led to confusion in ﬁnancial markets and unanticipated
effects. Reiterating the difﬁculty of knowing whether a change in interest
rates is sufﬁcient, Axilrod was dubious about relying exclusively on
forecasts of future economic activity and suggested that the monetary
base could be a useful source of information on current conditions.
In the general discussion, participants considered Friedman’s con-
cerns about the growth of electronic transactions. It was generally agreed
that the issue is not e-transactions per se but whether they pass through
the central bank’s books. In this regard, the challenge for the Fed is
maintaining its advantage in interbank settlements. Could another insti-
tution emerge as a serious competitor? The decline in the availability of
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of monetary policy; the Fed can operate in other assets.
MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The past thirty years have been characterized by profound changes
in the international economic and ﬁnancial environment. The U.S. econ-
omy has become increasingly linked—and exposed—to the rest of the
world through trade and investment ﬂows. Although the conventional
wisdom is that U.S. monetary policy is conducted with solely a U.S. focus,
Richard Cooper and Jane Little reviewed the FOMC’s Records of Policy
Actions and found numerous instances in which international develop-
ments affected policy. While the FOMC’s intent was to ensure a favorable
outcome for the U.S. economy, external events were clearly inﬂuential.
Cooper and Little also found that, despite the increasing openness of
the U.S. economy, the FOMC has become more reluctant to intervene
since the late 1980s and has allowed certain facilities for engaging in such
transactions to lapse. Cooper and Little believe that exchange rates are
vulnerable to large swings that are not driven by economic fundamentals
and, consequently, that the FOMC might wish to follow a more activist
policy in the future, particularly if the dollar were to fall sharply in value.
Accordingly, they recommended that the Fed prepare for such a possi-
bility by acquiring foreign securities or establishing lines of credit.
In addition to affecting the FOMC’s monetary policy deliberations,
international developments also inﬂuenced U.S. regulatory policy and
helped foster ﬁnancial innovation. Cooper and Little’s review revealed
important instances in which the activities of foreign banks and the
competition they posed to U.S. banks had far-reaching consequences for
U.S. ﬁnancial markets, leading to changes in both regulatory and mone-
tary policy. For example, foreign bank competition provided an impetus
for both interstate banking and the removal of barriers between commer-
cial and investment banking.
In his comments, Norman Fieleke observed that the U.S. economy
may have become even more open than Cooper and Little’s data on the
growth of trade suggest. A country might be very open to international
inﬂuence, in the sense of having no barriers to international goods and
capital ﬂows, but not actually engage in much international commerce if
its tastes, production technologies, and resource endowments were
similar to those of its trading and investment partners. Labor movements
should also be considered.
While Fieleke believes that the openness of the U.S. economy helped
hold down inﬂation during the 1990s expansion, he expressed concern
about the growth in the U.S. trade deﬁcit. Because the U.S. economy is so
large relative to those of its trading partners and because, despite
growing openness, traded goods comprise a comparatively small share of
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value of the dollar. In response, Cooper noted that rates of return are
higher in the United States than in most of the rest of the world and that
the share of world saving going to the United States is not large relative
to the U.S. share of world economic and ﬁnancial activity.
Robert Solomon suggested that Cooper and Little might have
overstated the role that international forces have played in shaping U.S.
ﬁnancial markets, and speciﬁcally in the breakdown in the relationship
between the monetary aggregates and the growth in GDP. He also
pointed out that large ﬂuctuations in U.S. exchange rates were frequently
due to domestic rather than external developments.
Much of the general discussion focused on a suggestion by Cooper
and Little that the Fed and other major central banks evaluate inﬂation
trends using Producer Price Indexes, rather than Consumer Price Indexes.
Because PPIs are composed primarily of traded goods, they would show
more similar patterns than the corresponding CPIs and thus, would
induce more coordinated policies. However, a number of participants
expressed concerns about the volatility of producer prices, the relevance
of the PPI in more services-oriented economies, and the difﬁculty of
communicating concerns about inﬂation to the public using the PPI rather
than the CPI. On the issue of volatility, Cooper pointed out that the PPI’s
greater variance might be advantageous, as a policy focused on the PPI
would tend to be more countercyclical.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM
The Federal Reserve is unusual among central banks in being
actively involved in processing checks and other forms of retail pay-
ments. Robert Eisenmenger and Paul Connolly explained why the Fed
was given this responsibility and how its role has evolved. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the check collection process was
characterized by lengthy delays and considerable uncertainty of pay-
ment; improving efﬁciency through the creation of a uniﬁed national
check collection system was one of the original mandates of the Federal
Reserve System. Over the years, the Fed worked with the banking
industry on a number of important initiatives to accelerate the check
collection process, including the development of high-speed sorting
equipment and machine-readable routing and account numbers.
Until the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA), the Fed followed a
pricing model for its payments services that was reminiscent, in Eisen-
menger and Connolly’s words, of a “country club.” Banks paid the
equivalent of annual dues to be members of the Federal Reserve System
in the form of the interest that they lost on the reserves maintained with
the System; in return, they received check-clearing and other services
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respondents for these same services.
With the passage of the MCA, the Fed was required to price most of
its payments services and to make them available to all depository
institutions, not just members. This put the Fed in the position of
competing with some of the large banks that were its biggest customers
and also induced the Fed to adopt a more customer-oriented mind-set. As
part of this new mind-set, the Fed became more aggressive in promoting
electronic forms of payment. For example, in the mid 1980s, the Boston
Fed embarked on a long-term research program to develop digitized
check images that could be transmitted electronically.
In the late 1990s, the Federal Reserve undertook a comprehensive
review of its role in retail payments under the leadership of Alice Rivlin,
who was then Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors. The Rivlin
Report reafﬁrmed the Fed’s involvement. Smaller banks, which prior to
the MCA had tended to view the Fed as more aligned with larger
institutions, were particularly supportive of the Fed remaining an active
provider. The report also called for the Fed to play a more active role in
improving the efﬁciency of existing payment systems and developing
lower-cost and lower-risk alternatives.
Elliott McEntee agreed that the Federal Reserve System has played
a beneﬁcial role in the payments system and has encouraged improve-
ments. However, he thinks that the Fed’s view of its appropriate role over
the next ﬁve years is too narrow—too focused on its own operations and
on the Automated Clearing House, in particular. McEntee recommended
that the Fed think more broadly about the possibilities offered by
electronic payments, mentioning debit cards as an example. He also
questioned whether the Fed’s presence in retail payments would be
justiﬁed beyond ﬁve years, as bank consolidation and the growth in
electronic commerce are likely to reduce check volumes considerably.
Much of the general discussion dealt with the outlook for paper
checks. Eisenmenger and Connolly acknowledged that the Federal Re-
serve System’s check business was likely to decline; but they also pointed
out that people have been predicting a decline in check activity for a long
time—and it has not happened. Checks are very convenient for many
transactions. While more explicit pricing for checks might lead to some
reduction in use, corporations continue to write checks despite explicit
charges.
Several participants commented that electronic transactions are not
convenient for some transactions and that safety is an issue. Moreover,
among electronic mechanisms, credit and debit cards dominate ACH for
some purposes. It was also suggested that one reason the Rivlin Report
found even large banks to be favorably disposed to the Fed’s continued
presence in retail payments is that banks see the Fed as an ally against
nonbank providers of electronic payments services. The Fed should
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based.
THE ROLE OF RESERVE BANKS
Gary Stern discussed the role of the Reserve Banks in the conduct of
monetary policy and some of the challenges they now face. The Federal
Reserve must balance independence and political accountability. It must
be prepared to take unpopular positions, but ultimately it must respond
to the public. In Stern’s judgment, the Reserve Banks are very important
to Federal Reserve independence. Traditionally, the operational respon-
sibilities of the Bank presidents and their visibility within their commu-
nities gave them a high degree of stature and public credibility. Accord-
ingly, Stern had been concerned that efforts to increase the operational
efﬁciency of the Federal Reserve System, particularly through consolida-
tion, might diminish the Reserve Banks, reduce the caliber of people
willing to serve as presidents, and eventually affect the Fed’s indepen-
dence in conducting monetary policy. The status quo had value.
Now, Stern believes that the opportunities for efﬁciency from greater
centralization have become so large that public accountability requires
that the Fed take advantage of them. In addition, technological advances
and the growth of new payments forms may mean that the Federal
Reserve ﬁnds its operational responsibilities declining. However, several
countervailing developments may make the consequences for Fed inde-
pendence and the conduct of monetary policy less dire than previously
feared. First is the increased public awareness of the importance of low
inﬂation and the role of monetary policy in achieving it. Second, the
Reserve Banks have become intellectual resources on a wide variety of
economic subjects. But whether the expanded intellectual capacity and
contributions of the Reserve Banks will prove sufﬁcient to offset the
consequences of reduced operational responsibilities is not assured.
Cathy Minehan shares Stern’s view that the regional contribution to
monetary policy is critical to Federal Reserve independence. The Reserve
Banks are important actors in their communities, as Frank Morris
demonstrated with his involvement in improving the Boston school
system. This participation in regional affairs builds support for the
Federal Reserve and helps to ensure that decision-making is grounded in
the real world. However, Minehan differs from Stern in seeing less of a
threat to the Reserve Banks’ operational role. Large dollar transfers will
likely remain a Fed responsibility. And checks have proved remarkably
durable; volumes have been rising. Operational stafﬁng in the Federal
Reserve Banks is down just 10 percent or so from what it was before the
Monetary Control Act. Looking forward, Minehan is more optimistic
about the Fed’s ability to remain an important player in the payments
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innovative products and solutions to problems.
In the general discussion, Chuck Freedman of the Bank of Canada
observed that most central banks have narrowed their focus and ques-
tioned why the Fed felt it should be expert on such a wide range of
subjects. Stern and Minehan responded that many issues are relevant to
central banks and that there is a strong demand for expertise from the
individual regions; in addition, the Congress has been increasing the
Fed’s responsibilities, particularly in the supervisory area.
Most of the discussion dealt with the Reserve Banks’ role in their
regions. Participants were generally very supportive of the contribution
of the Reserve Banks to the policy process. In particular, Reserve Banks
were seen to play an important role in communicating policy decisions.
They were said to provide a “public face,” with the presidents function-
ing as “ambassadors” to the public. Directors have been effective sup-
porters of Federal Reserve independence, as well. The intellectual inde-
pendence of the research functions of the Reserve Banks also contributes
importantly to monetary policy, as the different orientations and ap-
proaches of the twelve Banks stimulate debate and fresh thinking.
Several participants expressed a note of caution. The favorable
performance of the U.S. economy through most of the 1990s generated
positive feelings towards the Federal Reserve System and muted criti-
cism. If economic conditions were to deteriorate, attitudes towards the
Fed would change. People would look at the Fed more critically, and
questions about the desirability of the Reserve Bank presidents partici-
pating in the monetary policy process would reemerge. The Reserve
Banks must balance the need to use resources efﬁciently with maintaining
a structure that most participants agreed is critical to monetary policy
independence.
CONFERENCE THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of the conference, Cathy Minehan commented that
Frank Morris had said that being President of the Boston Fed was the best
job in the country. While not all the conference participants shared
Frank’s enthusiasm for Boston, being associated with the Federal Reserve
System was seen as a very positive experience by everyone who had
worked in the System or served as a director. The opportunity to
participate in deliberations over monetary policy was intellectually
stimulating. Representing the Federal Reserve System to the public was
rewarding. Developing a more efﬁcient payments system was challeng-
ing. Time and again, people spoke of the satisfactions of working with
good people on big problems in service of the public.
Reviewing the experience of the past thirty years is, in some ways,
unsettling. The spirited debates in the 1970s over the role of the monetary
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deﬁne the appropriate objective for monetary policy. Today, the impor-
tance of price stability is generally acknowledged. However, the U.S.
experience of the late 1990s was so favorable that the depth of this
commitment was not really tested. Moreover, the operational problems
associated with using interest rates as the instrument of monetary policy
are unresolved, and the conceptual attractiveness of a nominal anchor or
guidepost remains.
International developments have been more inﬂuential than gener-
ally given credit. Not only have they affected monetary policy directly,
but, in addition, competition from overseas ﬁnancial institutions has
shaped the U.S. ﬁnancial system and indirectly inﬂuenced policy. While
the United States has beneﬁted greatly from growing international ties,
increasing dependence on the saving of the rest of the world poses risks.
Attractive investment opportunities in the United States may justify these
inﬂows now, but international ﬁnancial markets are prone to abrupt
reversals.
Reserve Banks contribute importantly to monetary policy. They were
active in the debates over the roles of the monetary aggregates in the
1970s. They provide valuable information on regional conditions and
communicate policy decisions to the public. The stature of the Reserve
Banks and of their presidents is enhanced by their prominent role in the
payments system. The Reserve Banks have been very successful in
adapting to a competitive environment in which they must charge for
payment services they provide. They have become more efﬁcient and
more innovative. They are actively promoting more electronic payments
mechanisms. However, care must be taken that efforts to improve
payments efﬁciency do not undermine the Reserve Banks’ intellectual
independence or their ability to serve as the public face of monetary
policy.
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